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Abstract
We incorporate the behaviour of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional
Ising model and augment it by providing policy-makers with the opportunity
to curb tax evasion via an appropriate enforcement mechanism. We discuss
different network structures in which tax evasion may vary greatly over time
if no measures of control are taken. Furthermore, we show that even minimal
enforcement levels may help to alleviate this problem substantially.
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21 Introduction
In economics, the problem of tax evasion from a multi-agent-based perspective has
received little attention so far (see Bloomquist (2006) for a recent overview). Real-
istic models on tax evasion appear to be necessary, because tax evasion remains to
be a major predicament facing governments (see Andreoni et al., 1998; Lederman,
2003; Slemrod, 2007).
Experimental evidence (see Ga¨chter, 2006) suggests that tax payers usually con-
dition their decision regarding whether to pay taxes or not on the tax evasion decision
of the members of their group (“conditional cooperation”). Conditional cooperators
are more likely to evade taxes if they have the impression that many others evade.
On the other hand if most others behave honestly, an individual is less likely to
cheat on her taxes. Ga¨chter presents the findings of public goods experiments and
argues that conditional cooperation primarily motivates people to either contribute
to the provision of a public good or to free-ride. Frey and Torgler (2006) provide
empirical evidence on the relevance of conditional cooperation for tax morale. They
find a positive correlation between people’s tax morale, which is measured by asking
whether tax evasion is justified if the chance arises, and their perception regarding
how many others evade paying tax. Conditional cooperation from the viewpoint of
the standard economic theory may be explained by changes in risk aversion due to
changes in equity (Falkinger, 1995).
We decide to use the Ising model, because it allows to model conditional cooper-
ation in a multi-agent-based fashion. It allows to consider a large number of agents
who interact locally with each other and base their decision whether to evade taxes
or not on the behaviour of the other agents in their group.
We incorporate the behaviour of tax evasion and add an enforcement mechanism
into the standard two-dimensional square lattice Ising spin model. We aim to extend
the study of Zaklan et al. (2008), which illustrates how, in a world where agents are
conditionally cooperative, different levels of enforcement affect aggregate tax evasion
over time. We define enforcement to consist of two components: a probability of an
audit (p) each person is subject to in every period and a length of time detected tax
3evaders need to remain honest for (k periods). We embed our tax evasion model into
different network structures and find for these networks that fluctuation in aggregate
tax evasion behaviour may arise if no enforcement is used. For our simulations we
make use of the “tunnelling” process at temperatures slightly below the critical
temperature. This process has been used for two decades in the field of physics,
and also by Hohnisch et al. (2005) for the IFO-Index. We use it to illustrate
a second important and maybe less obvious effect of enforcement, as we define
it: we provide evidence, by simulation, that even minimal levels of enforcement
may help to reduce the presence of fluctuations in tax evasion. Such fluctuations
can be completely prevented in the considered networks by setting the enforcement
measures to sufficiently high, but realistic, levels. Everybody then remains compliant
for most of the time.
The remainder of our manuscript is organised as follows: in section 2 we present
our model, which is based on the standard two-dimensional Ising model on a square
lattice. In section 3 we decribe the evolution of the aggregate tax evasion behaviour
that our model generates under different enforcement regimes. In section 4 we
additionally embed our model into the Baraba´si-Albert network and the Voronoi-
Delaunay random lattice and discuss the resulting tax evasion dynamics.
2 The model
We use the standard Glauber kinetics of the Ising model on a 20 × 20 square lattice
(in section 4 we will analyse our model for other lattice types). In every time period
each lattice site is occupied by an individual who can either be an honest tax payer
(Si = +1) or a tax evader (Si = −1). The small number of agents may be imagined
to represent the elite of a country, whose tax evasion behaviour it may be interesting
to look at, given the different enforcement regimes of the tax authority. For our
analysis we assume that everybody is honest initially. Each period individuals have
the opportunity to become the opposite type of agent as they were in the previous
period. Each agent’s social network, which is made up of four next neighbours, may
either prefer tax evasion, reject it or be indifferent.
4Tax evaders have the greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax evaders
if they constitute a majority in the given neighbourhood. If the majority evades,
one is likely to also evade. On the other hand, if most people in the vicinity are
honest, the respective individual is likely to become a decent citizen if she was a tax
evader before. How strong the influence from the neighbourhood is can be controlled
by adjusting the temperature, T . Total energy is given by the Hamiltonian H =
−
∑
<i,j> JijSiSj−B
∑
i Si. We choose J = 1 and B = 0. For very low temperatures,
the autonomous part of decision-making almost completely disappears.1 Individuals
then base their decisions solely on what most of their neighbours do. A rising
temperature has the opposite effect. Individuals then decide more autonomously. It
is well known that for T > Tc (≈ 2.269), half of the people are honest and the other
half cheat, while for T < Tc states coordinated on cheating or compliance prevail
for most of the time.
As an enforcement measure, we introduce a probability of an efficient audit (p).
If tax evasion is detected, the individual must remain honest for a certain number of
periods. We denote the period of time for which detected tax evaders are punished
by the variable k. One time unit is one sweep through the entire lattice. Audits are
stochastically independent from other agents and from the history any agent has.
3 Dynamics of the model
— Figure 1 goes about here —
The top-left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the baseline setting, i.e. no use of enforce-
ment, for the square lattice. We depict the dynamics of tax evasion over 50, 000 time
steps. Although everybody is honest initially, it is not possible to predict which level
of tax compliance will be reached at some time step in the future. Agents are usu-
ally either mostly compliant or mostly non-compliant, whereas the system typically
remains in either state for a while. Switching from a mostly compliant to a mostly
1The autonomous part of individual decision-making is responsible for the emergence of the tax
evasion problem, because some initially honest tax payers decide to evade taxes and then exert
influence on others to do so as well.
5non-compliant society, or vice versa, is favoured by both the small number of agents
and the temperature, which needs to be somewhere close to the critical level (we use
T ≈ Tc). If, by chance, more than 50% of agents start to prefer the opposite action
of the currently dominating one, this strategy will then start to prevail for a while.
As soon as there is a majority for the previously dominating strategy regarding tax
evasion, aggregate behaviour is then likely to reverse again. If more agents or a
temperature further below the critical level are picked, it would take longer for a
switch in aggregate evasion behaviour to occur. Apparently, a suitable measure of
control is needed to prevent agents from repeatedly falling into non-compliance.
— Figure 2 goes about here —
Figure 2 illustrates different simulation settings for the square lattice, where for each
considered combination of degree of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50) and audit rate
(p = 0.5, 10 and 90%) the corresponding dynamics of tax evasion is depicted over
50, 000 time steps. Surprisingly, even very small levels of enforcement (e.g. p = 0.5%
and k = 1) suffice to almost completely prevent fluctuation in aggregate tax evasion
behaviour and to establish mainly compliance. Only seldomly tax evasion then
becomes the predominant aggregate choice of action. Both, a rise in audit probability
(greater p) and a higher penalty (greater k), work to flatten the time series of
tax evasion and to shift the band of possible non-compliance values towards more
compliance. If the audit rate is increased to the level of 1%, even for very small
penalties (k = 1) then an upsurge in tax evasion will not occur any longer (not
displayed). Since high income earners are audited more often (p ≈ 10%) than
average income tax payers (p ≈ 1%), we look at how results change if higher levels
of enforcement are used (p = 10%). Interestingly, higher audit rates only reduce
the level of tax evasion marginally. The simulations illustrate that even extreme
enforcement measures (e.g. p = 90% and k = 50) cannot fully resolve the problem
of tax evasion.
64 Modifications
To examine whether the results generated by the square lattice are robust, we extend
our analysis to other frequently used network structures. Specifically, we make use
of the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice and the Baraba´si-Albert network model.
The construction of the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice (i.e. tessellation of the plane for
a given set of points) is defined as follows (Lima et al., 2000). For each point, one
first needs to determine the polygonal cell, consisting of the region of space nearer
to that point than to any other point. Whenever two such cells share an edge, they
are considered to be neighbours. From the Voronoi tessellation, one can obtain the
dual lattice by the following procedure: when two cells are neighbours, a link is
placed between the two points located in the cells. From the links, one obtains the
triangulation of space. The network constructed in this manner, which we use for
simulation, is called the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice.
The Baraba´si-Albert network (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) is grown such that
the probability of a new site to be connected to one of the already existing sites is
proportional to the number of connections the existing site has already accumulated
over time: individuals with many friends are more likely to gain new friends than
loners.
In these variations of our simple square lattice model we also choose 400 agents
and depict the resulting tax evasion dynamics over 50, 000 time steps.
The remaining pictures in Figure 1 illustrate the dynamics in the baseline setting
in these additional network structures of our model. Both networks, the Voronoi-
Delaunay lattice and the Baraba´si-Albert network, support our findings in the case
of the square lattice, namely that fluctuations in tax evasion behaviour may occur
if no enforcement mechanism is implemented.
— Figure 3 goes about here —
Figure 3 illustrates the tax evasion dynamics for the Voroi-Delaunay lattice (first
column) and the Baraba´si-Albert (other two columns) network, if different degrees
of enforcement are used.
7For the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice we also find that fluctuations in tax
evasion can be reduced substantially by implementing very low probabilities of an
audit. For an audit rate of p = 1% no fluctuations occur any longer and society
remains mainly honest over time. Obviously higher punishments, i.e. higher levels
of k, also lower the amount of non-compliance.
The next two columns illustrate that enforcement in the Baraba´si-Albert network
is less efficient than in the Voronoi-Delaunay network or in the simple square lattice.
As can be seen, fluctuations still occur for p = 1%, even for high levels of punishment
(e.g. k = 10). The last column illustrates the tax evasion dynamics, holding the
audit rate constant at p = 4.5%. This is the minimal audit rate which (almost
always) prevents tax evasion from fluctuating, even for the lowest considered level
of punishment (i.e. k = 1), and is much higher than in the other two network
models, yet still at a realistic level.
5 Conclusion
Tax evasion can vary widely across nations, reaching extremely high values in some
developing countries. Wintrobe and Ge¨rxhani (2004) explain the observed higher
level of tax evasion in generally less developed countries with a lesser amount of
trust that people accord to governmental institutions. Empirical evidence for the
importance of trust for tax compliance may, for example, be found in Hyun (2005)
and in Torgler (2004). So far we have neglected the effects of public opinion, which
may vary greatly across countries, on tax evasion. It therefore seems worthwhile to
extend the setting of our simple model in a further study, to specifically analyse the
aspect of varying tax compliance across countries.
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Figure 1: The baseline setting is given if no enforcement measure is implemented
to control tax evasion. The figures above illustrate the baseline settings for the
different network structures we use. For the square lattice we take T = 2.265,
for the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice Tc = 3.802 and for the Baraba´si-Albert network
0.8 · Tc = 0.8 · m · log(NSITES)/2 (where m = 4 and NSITES = 400). All
simulations are performed over 50, 000 time steps.
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Figure 2: The square lattice model of tax evasion with various degrees of
enforcement. (T = 2.265 and 50, 000 time steps)
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Figure 3: The first column illustrates the resulting tax evasion dynamics for different
enforcement regimes if the Voronoi-Delaunay network is used. The next two columns
depict the tax evasion dynamics in the case of the Baraba´si-Albert network. Again,
we use 50, 000 time steps.
